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Abstract
We define cryptographic assumptions applicable to two mistrustful parties who each
control two or more separate secure sites between which special relativity ensures a time
lapse in communication. We show that, under these assumptions, unconditionally secure
coin tossing can be carried out by exchanges of classical information. We then show
that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, coin tossing is strictly weaker than bit
commitment. That is, no unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol can be built
from a finite number of invocations of a secure coin tossing black box together with finitely
many additional classical or quantum information exchanges.
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The problem of remote coin tossing was introduced into the cryptographic literature in
a classic 1981 paper by Blum.[1] A coin tossing protocol involve two mistrustful separated
parties who wish to use an information channel — e.g. a phone line — to generate a bit
in whose randomness both are confident.
Coin tossing is a simple cryptographic primitive with many applications in more com-
plicated tasks. To give a well known example, it can be used to authenticate a remote
user, say to their bank, as follows. The user’s N digit passkey is known to both user and
bank. Whenever the user logs in, a series of coin tosses between user and bank are used to
generate a random n digit substring of the N digits, where n is significantly smaller than
N . The user is then required to reveal only those n digits of the passkey, and is accepted
if they agree with the bank’s records. This has the virtue that neither an eavesdropper
nor someone impersonating the bank can obtain very much of the passkey during a small
number of logins; in particular, neither has much chance of subsequently successfully con-
vincing the bank that they are the user. By changing the passkey at appropriate intervals,
security can thus be maintained.
Coin tossing also raises interesting theoretical questions, in that its relation to other
primitives has not so far been resolved.
Bit commitment is another well known cryptographic primitive of great theoretical
and practical interest, also involving two mistrustful parties. In a bit commitment protocol,
one party, Alice, supplies an encoded bit to another, Bob. Alice tries to ensure that Bob
cannot decode the bit until she reveals further information, while convincing Bob that she
was genuinely committed all along. That is, Bob must be convinced that the protocol does
not allow two different decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal either 0 or 1,
as she wishes.
It is well known that secure coin tossing can easily be implemented given a secure
bit commitment protocol.[e.g.2] Alice commits a random bit to Bob, who makes a random
guess at it. Alice then unveils the bit, and the parties generate (say) a 0 if Bob’s guess
was correct, and a 1 otherwise.
This raises the question of whether the reverse is possible. As is by now well under-
stood, quantum information has very different properties from classical information. In
particular, some important cryptographic tasks can implemented securely using quantum
information, but not using classical information.[3,4] Thus, the question of the relation of
coin tossing and bit commitment subdivides into at least two independently interesting
questions: whether secure bit commitment can be built on top of secure coin tossing using
classical or quantum information exchanges. Both questions appear to have remained open
to date (see e.g. Ref. [5]). My impression, for what it is worth, is that most experts’ best
guess would have been that in the classical case the reduction was probably impossible,
while the quantum case was regarded as anyone’s guess.
There are many forms of security, of which the strongest and most interesting is un-
conditional security: an unconditionally secure protocol relies only on the known laws of
physics to ensure that the probability of successful cheating by either party can be made
arbitrarily small. Under standard non-relativistic cryptographic assumptions, uncondi-
tionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.[5,6,7,8,9] We follow general usage
in referring to this result as the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem or MLC theorem.
Unconditionally secure ideal coin tossing — that is, coin tossing with probabilities
precisely one half — has also been shown to be impossible by Lo and Chau.[9] However,
it is not known whether non-ideal coin tossing, in which the probabilities are bounded
by ( 1
2
± ǫ), and ǫ can be made arbitrarily small, can be implemented with unconditional
security in quantum theory. Clearly, if it can be shown that quantum bit commitment can
be built on top of coin tossing, then unconditionally secure quantum coin tossing must be
impossible. Conversely, if it can be shown that quantum bit commitment cannot be built
on top of coin tossing, we have no conclusive argument showing that an unconditionally
secure quantum coin tossing protocol cannot be found. Such a protocol would be very
useful.
The main result of this paper resolves the relation between the two protocols by
showing that secure bit commitment cannot be built on top of secure coin tossing in any
finite classical or quantum protocol. Though this result applies to standard non-relativistic
cryptography, its proof is inspired by considering cryptography in the context of relativity.
The standard non-relativistic cryptographic scenario for two mistrustful parties is as
follows. A and B each control a laboratory, which includes sending and receiving equip-
ment, measuring devices and classical and perhaps quantum computers. The laboratories
are separated and generally assumed to be small. A and B have faith in the integrity of
their own equipment, but trust nothing whatsoever outside their laboratories. In particu-
lar, neither of them has any way of ensuring that a message sent by the other was sent a
certain time before receipt, and so an effectively simultaneous exchange of messages cannot
be arranged. A standard cryptographic protocol thus prescribes a sequential exchange of
messages between A and B, in which message i+1 is not sent until the sender has received
message i.
We will also need to consider an alternative cryptographic scenario in which special
relativity plays a roˆle. Alice and Bob agree on a frame and global coordinates, and on the
location of two sites x
1
, x
2
whose neighbourhoods Bob may control at all times. Alice is not
allowed within a distance ǫ of either point at any time. Alice is, however, required to erect
laboratories within a distance δ of the sites, where ∆x = |x
1
− x
2
| ≫ δ > ǫ. The precise
location of Alice’s laboratories need not be disclosed to Bob: he need only test that signals
sent out from either of his laboratories receive a response within time 2δ. Bob could, for
example, build laboratories of radius ǫ around each of the xi, but the precise location of
his laboratories need not be known to Alice. She need only test that any signal broadcast
from one of her laboratories receives a reply within time 2δ, whenever her laboratory is in
the prescribed region. Let the laboratories near xi be Ai and Bi, for i = 1 or 2. We assume
that the Ai collaborate with complete mutual trust and with prearranged agreement, and
identify them together simply as Alice; similarly the Bi are identified as Bob. From the
point of view of cryptographic analysis, any protocol in this scenario may be considered
as an two-party cryptographic protocol. The only unusual cryptographic feature is that
the parties each occupy disconnected laboratories, and even this is inessential: A and B
could equally well occupy laboratories that are connected, long, thin, and adjacent on their
longer side. The crucial difference from standard analyses is that the relativistic signalling
constraints which this situation imposes are taken into account.
There is a very simple unconditionally secure classical protocol for ideal coin-tossing
under this circumstances. At a pre-arranged time t, A1 generates a random bit and sends
it to B1; at the same time, B2 generates a random bit and sends it to A2. More precisely,
since the time of sending cannot be checked directly, the bits are sent at or after time t, and
so as to arrive before time t+δ in each case. The Ai and Bi then compare the bits they sent
and received — which, of course, involves a delay of order ∆x. If the two bits are equal, the
protocol generates a 0; if unequal, a 1. The separation of the laboratories means that each
party can be confident that the other’s bit was sent in ignorance of their own. Each party
can hence be confident of the randomness of the generated bit. Quantum attacks clearly
do not affect the protocol’s security, since it relies only on the causal relations of special
relativity, so that the protocol also defines an unconditionally secure quantum coin-tossing
protocol.
On the other hand, a simple application of the Mayers-Lo-Chau argument[5,8] shows
that no classical or quantum bit commitment protocol that uses a finite sequence of mes-
sages can be permanently unconditionally secure in this scenario. By permanent security,
we mean here that after the protocol is concluded, it remains indefinitely impossible for
Alice or Bob to cheat, no matter how much information is transferred between the Ai
or between the Bi. Clearly, this cannot be attained by a finite protocol, since after the
protocol is concluded, all data that the Ai hold or receive can, after a finite time interval,
be transferred to one representative, say A1; similarly the Bi can transfer all their data to
B1. At this point, the situation is identical to that after the implementation of a quantum
bit commitment protocol in the standard scenario.
To see this, note that the Ai and Bi can carry out every step in any relativistic protocol
at the quantum level. In particular, any random choices required by the protocol can be
kept at the quantum level by entangling suitably chosen ”quantum dice” — ancillary
systems in a state
∑
i
pi|i〉 — with the transmitted states via a quantum computer. If
both Ai (or both Bi) are required to make the same random choice at spacelike separated
points, they can do so, using previously constructed shared random dice, with states of
the form
∑
i
pi|i〉1|i〉2, where the | 〉i states are under the control of the i-th party. After
the end of the finite protocol, all the quantum information held by A2 can be given to A1,
and all the quantum information held by B2 can be given to B1. We then have a situation
in which A1 and B1 share some pure state |ψ〉 lying in the tensor product Hilbert space
HA⊗HB , where HA and HB describe the degrees of freedom under the control of A1 and
B1 respectively. This is precisely the situation analysed by Mayers, Lo and Chau, and their
theorem applies: either B1 can cheat by distinguishing the commitments of 0 and 1 with
non-zero probability before revelation, or else A1 can follow the protocol for committing a
0 and then cheat to reveal a 1 with non-zero probability, and the two cheating probabilities
cannot simultaneously be small.[6,9]
It follows that coin-tossing is a weaker primitive than bit commitment in the relativis-
tic scenario outlined. Perhaps more surprisingly, it follows also that coin-tossing is weaker
under standard cryptographic assumptions. For suppose there were a finite standard bit
commitment protocol which was provably secure modulo the security of a coin-tossing black
box. That is, Alice and Bob have some trusted way of generating random bits between
them, and build up a secure bit commitment protocol by a finite sequence of classical or
quantum communications interspersed with finitely many invocations of the random bit
generation. Any such protocol could be transferred to the relativistic scenario, by replacing
the classical and quantum communications between A and B by identical communications
between A1 and B2, and replacing the coin-tossing black box by implementations of the
above secure quantum coin-tossing protocol involving the Ai and Bi. So long as the mes-
sages are carried out in the same sequence, the bit commitment protocol would necessarily
remain secure in the relativistic scenario. But we have seen that no secure finite bit com-
mitment protocol exists in this scenario. Hence the initial assumption must be impossible:
there is no finite permanently secure standard bit commitment protocol built on a secure
coin-tossing black box.
It has recently been shown that unconditionally secure bit commitment protocols
based on an indefinite exchange of messages do exist in the relativistic scenario.[10,11]
We have seen here another intriguing aspect of the interplay between relativity and in-
formation: relativistic cryptography appears to provide not only new practically useful
protocols — of which the coin tossing protocol above is an example — but also a useful
perspective on standard cryptographic relations. It should be noted, however, that while
relativistic considerations motivate the proof, they are not essential in establishing the
result. The only essential relativistic ingredient we have used is the guarantee of a time
delay in communicating between certain representatives of A and B, and the proof can be
recast abstractly using only this property.
Finally, it is worth remarking that cryptographic tasks give a way of calibrating the
properties of information in any physical theory, correct or not, by asking whether or not
any given task can be securely implemented. The fact that coin tossing is strictly weaker
than bit commitment means they define distinct calibrations of physical information. It
would be interesting, and perhaps theoretically useful, to use the hierarchy of cryptographic
protocols as a way of isolating different properties of information which can be realised in
different physical models.
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